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Board diversity and total directors’ 
remuneration: evidence from an emerging 
market 
 
1 Introduction  
An increasing interest in studies of board diversity has come with a shift from 
traditional views of the contribution or role of boards of directors to more complex 
perceptions of their impact on the organisational performance of their firms.1 Studies 
examining the relationship between board diversity (mainly gender) and firm 
performance include Adams and Ferreira (2009), Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008), Carter et al. (2003), Chapple and Humphrey (2014), Francoer et al. (2008), 
Nekhili and Gatfouni (2013) and Wellalage and Locke (2013). Boulouta (2013) 
extends this line by examining firm performance from the perspective of board gender 
diversity and corporate social performance; in general, findings concerning board 
diversity and firm performance are rather mixed. Low et al. (2015) examine the board 
gender diversity and firm performance in four Asian countries; Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Malaysia and Singapore in which they find an increasing number of female 
directors have a positive effect on firm performance. Studies such as those of Labelle 
                                                 
 
 
1 Board diversity is defined as variety in the composition of the board of directors and can be categorised by 
directly observable factors such as nationality, age, gender and ethnic background, or by less visible features 
such as educational, functional and occupational background (Kang et al., 2007). 
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et al. (2010) and Srinidhi et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between board 
diversity and financial reporting quality.  Labelle et al. (2010) examine the role of 
diversity management and the magnitude of earnings management. Based on United 
States data, Srinidhi et al. (2011) examine whether gender-diverse boards exhibit 
higher earnings. The work of Adams and Ferreira (2009) provides a thorough 
examination of the impact of women in the boardroom on governance and 
performance.  
In addition, a line of research has focused on the gender gap in directors’ 
remuneration. Studies have largely focused on data from the United States (e.g. 
Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Conyon, 2014; Graham et al., 2012; Hill et al., 2014; Shin, 
2012) and United Kingdom (e.g. Kulich et al., 2011), which find a pay gap exists 
between the genders. All these studies find a negative relationship between women’s 
participation on boards and remuneration, with the exceptions of Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Hill et al. (2014). Our choice of examining the impact of board diversity 
on compensation is based on several reasons. First, there seems to be paucity of 
research examining this relationship as suggested by Hill et al. (2014). Second, 
examining the impact of board diversity on compensation reflects the overall valuable 
contribution by either gender or ethnic diverse boards, or both (Anderson et al., 2011; 
Hill et al., 2014) on an entity. The premise behind advocating a diverse board lies in 
the idea of resource dependence theory. One would expect that a diverse board would 
provide a better resource-seeking mechanism for the organisation; whether it would 
affect directors’ remuneration remains an empirical question. Another relevant theory 
would be agency theory that suggests monitoring could increase in ethnically diverse 
boards as these boards are expected to be more critical since the board consist of 
directors of not the same background (Carter et al., 2003).  
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There has been significant interest in the role of women in boardrooms in 
Malaysia. On 27 June 2011, Prime Minister of Malaysia Dato’ Seri Najib Tun Razak 
announced that the Malaysian cabinet had approved legislation whereby corporate 
companies must achieve at least 30 per cent of female representation on all boards of 
directors. A subsequent announcement by the then Deputy Prime Minister Tan Sri 
Muhyidin Yassin on 15 September 2013 indicated that the government was 
considering how to further boost women’s participation in the corporate sector. This 
study is therefore timely with respect to both the extant literature and to ongoing 
policy in Malaysia.  
Nevertheless, previous researches indicate that women’s participation in Malaysia 
is still low. Ahmad-Zaluki (2012) indicates that female representation on board of 
directors in 228 Malaysian companies prior to the IPO is only about 8 percent and 
in 2011, the percentage of female directors increases only 2.5 percent from the 
pre‐IPO year. The increment is not statistically significant. She finds greater 
percentage of female representation leads to lower long run underperformance. In 
contrast, Marimuthu (2008) and Shukeri et al. (2012) find that there is no 
significant relationship between gender diversity on firm performance in the year 
2011.  
Men are earning on average of RM2,260 a month, compared with RM2,071 for 
women or a difference of 8.4%, according to the National Statistics Department’s 
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Salaries and Wages Survey Report 2013. While in 2012, men earned an average of 
RM2,083 a month, against RM1,912 for women, a variance of 8.2% (Lee, 2015). The 
results may suggest that something need to be done to increase women representation 
as required by the government policy.2 
Therefore, the study first objective is to investigate the relationship between 
gender-diverse boards and total directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. Based on 1094 
firm-year observations during 2007-2009, we find women directors affect positively 
and significantly the level of directors’ remuneration, signalling that they are being 
valued for their expertise. The period of 2007-2009 was chosen as our sample to 
reflect the impact of global financial crisis on directors’ remuneration. Turner (2009) 
argues that the inappropriate incentive structures might have contributed to the crisis. 
It indicates that directors’ remuneration could contribute to the financial crisis in 
2007-2009. Therefore, investigating the effect of board diversity towards directors’ 
remuneration during this period could highlight the importance of having diversity in 
the board of listed firms. 
Malaysia provides a useful avenue for research as it is an emerging market, and 
its capital market exists within a diverse ethnic background. Malaysia is categorised 
as an emerging market as it has rather complex pyramidal shareholdings structure that 
might not be present in developed market (Fan and Wang, 2002). In addition, 
emerging market economies are well known for relationship-based economy that 
                                                 
 
 
2 This survey is referring to all men and women in Malaysia.  
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requires political connections for the market to sustain in the future (Bliss and Gul, 
2012a, 2012b). 3 
A review on directors’ compensation studies in Asia Pacific region by Sun et al. 
(2010) suggests there is a gap in studies on compensation in Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
institutional setting is different from those of other studies that have focused on ethnic 
minorities, in that one ethnic group, Bumiputras, have a unique position and this 
affects their participation in the capital market. Bumiputras, whose name was coined 
by the British to distinguish the indigenous Malays from the non-indigenous people of 
then Malaya, form the largest population group in this racially diverse country but 
have a low level of participation in the corporate sector. This study is therefore timely 
in determining the role of an ethnic group that is a majority in terms of population but 
a minority in terms of the corporate sector or capital market, and in providing an 
overview of the effect of ethnic participation on boards in an emerging market. The 
choice of Malaysia fills the gap raised by Sun et al. (2010) on social implication as 
determinants on remuneration in Asia. Sun et al. (2010) highlight the importance of 
understanding the institutional settings and cultural factors that might explain the 
variance in directors’ compensation.  
Thus, the second research objective is to investigate the relationship between 
ethnically diverse board and total directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. We find that 
                                                 
 
 
3The stock exchange of Malaysia has operated since 1964 and listed firms. The securities exchange unit lists more 
than 1,000 companies on its main bourse, the second board for mid-capitals and the technology 
focused Mesdaq market.  
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the proportion of Bumiputras directors is negatively and significantly in relation to 
directors’ remuneration.  
 Malaysia’s dedication to increasing the proportion of women in boardrooms and 
the corporate sector offers an excellent opportunity to re-examine the connections 
between gender-diverse boards and directors’ remuneration; and the presence of a 
particular ethnic group that is given special opportunities in corporations allows a 
similar examination of ethnically diverse boards and directors’ remuneration.  
It also makes possible a study of the interaction of these two types of board 
diversity against directors’ remuneration. Therefore, our third research objective is to 
investigate the interaction between the gender-diverse and ethnic-diverse boards and 
their impact to directors’ remuneration. Our study of board diversity suggests that the 
negative impact of Bumiputras directors is lessened by the presence of women 
directors. 
To provide a more holistic view of the Malaysian institutional background, 
several other institutional variables that are proven in the Malaysian capital market are 
included in the analysis, such as family firms, politically connected firms and 
institutional ownership. As boards of directors are an integral part of governance 
mechanisms as well, several corporate governance variables are included in the 
framework. 
We extend our analyses by examining the concept of tokenism to critical mass for 
both gender-diverse and ethnic-diverse boards. The premise of this test is to 
investigate whether the number of both women and Bumiputras directors achieved 
critical mass, and thus has a positive relationship on total directors’ remuneration. We 
find that both, women and Bumiputras directors achieved critical mass at three 
directors or more.  
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Our findings add to the work of Carter et al. (2003, 2010) and Hill et al. (2014) in 
that we examine two specific forms of diversity simultaneously, adding to the extant 
literature by examining the effect of both gender and ethnicity on boards. We also 
complement the work of Adams and Ferreira (2009), Hill et al. (2014) and Lucas-
Perez et al. (2015) in investigating the effect of board diversity on directors’ 
remuneration. The choice of Malaysian firms is particularly useful and interesting 
because of the legislated role of ethnic groups, as compared to other countries’ 
approaches to board composition such as that of the United States (e.g. Carter et al., 
2003, 2010). The review on executive compensation studies by Sun et al. (2010) 
suggest limited studies based on the Malaysian capital market. Therefore, our study 
reduces the ‘gap’ on compensation studies in the Asian region. Our results are robust 
after controlling for variables such as corporate governance, institutional, and various 
firm characteristics. 
Further, our study extends the recent literature on the role of both women 
(Abdullah et al., 2016) and ethnicity (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gul et al., 2016) on 
firm performance in Malaysia.  
2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Women on boards in Malaysia 
Malaysia, a key emerging country in South East Asia, has taken an initiative in 
line with several developed countries to boost women’s presence in the workforce. On 
27 June 2011, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak announced that the 
Malaysian cabinet had approved a policy whereby corporate companies in the private 
sector must achieve at least 30 per cent representation of women in decision-making 
positions. The policy is seen as significant, as female representation on boards is only 
six per cent (Deloitte, 2013). The percentage increased to ten after more than a year. 
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A recent study by Low et al. (2015) on board gender diversity and firm performance 
in four Asian countries find the percentage of female directors on Malaysian board is 
11.06 percent as at 2013.4 In addition, Low highlighted that Malaysia has the highest 
mean percentage of female directors on board, as relative to the other three countries 
in their sample.  
The Gender Diversity Benchmark for Asia 2014 ranked Malaysia second for 
having the highest percentage of companies attaining gender parity, which is set at 
35.3 per cent.5 This gender policy surpasses that of developed countries like Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, which currently have no 
quotas for women on boards or in senior management positions (Deloitte, 2013). 
Malaysian regulators such as the Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia 
have taken an initiative to promote diversity and inclusiveness. For example, 
Guidance 5.2 of the Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors 2014 states that these 
investors should assess the quality of disclosure made by investee companies on 
various diversity targets and policies including gender, age and ethnicity (Ramli, 
2014). Companies that promote diversity in the workplace are given recognition, to 
encourage further participation in diversity and inclusiveness. The ACCA Malaysia 
Sustainability Reporting Awards (MaSRA) 2014, for example, provides awards for 
‘Sustainability in the Workplace’ under the theme ‘Sustainability and Inclusiveness’.  
                                                 
 
 
4 The four countries are HongKong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore.   
5 Gender parity is a numerical concept related to gender equality. In the context of gender equality, gender parity 
refers to the equal contribution of women and men to every dimension of life, whether private or public. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
ur
tin
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
0:
25
 0
3 
A
pr
il 
20
18
 (P
T)
9 
2.2 Malaysia’s socio-political economy 
Malaysian corporate ownership is divided into groups of ethnicity: Malays, 
Chinese, Indian and other small minority groups. These ethnic lines can be clearly 
observed in the listed firm whose share ownership and board membership are 
dominated by two main ethnic groups which are Bumiputras Malays and Chinese 
(Yatim et al., 2006). Each ethnic grouping has different beliefs and ideologies, which 
influence their way of thinking, of making decisions and directing an organisation.  
Historical factors and cultural characteristics have had a significant impact on the 
development of the capital market. For instance, the low presence of Bumiputras in 
the economy is in sharp contrast with the strong Chinese presence. Mansor and 
Kennedy (2000) note that indigenous Malay cultural values reflect their history of 
communal living and cooperation, which tend to place a high value on collectivism. It 
is possible that this historical background has led them to place a low value on the 
entrepreneurial skills that other ethnic groups in Malaysia display. Government 
policies have been put in place to help redress the economic imbalance that has 
resulted from this attitude; and to assist Bumiputras to gain a share of the economy 
that reflects their proportion in the population. It is also thought that more equitable 
participation by Bumiputras may help to promote political stability in a nation where 
ethnic tensions sometimes lead to violence (Mohammad Yusuf, 2012). In contrast, 
Chinese leaders show remarkable leadership skill and have successfully developed 
their businesses as professionally managed organisations. The Chinese protected their 
business by developing connections with Malays prior to the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 (White, 2004); and Ball et al. (2003) note that at the 
time they wrote Chinese Malaysians controlled nearly 69 per cent of market 
capitalisation, although their population stood at only 29 per cent. However, 
Bumiputras’ shareholdings in the capital market have increased steadily over the 
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years, especially since the implementation of NEP: by 2008 their shareholdings stood 
at 21.9 per cent, short of the 30 per cent targeted earlier by the government but better 
than before the NEP. 
 
3 Empirical Predictions 
3.1 Gender-diverse boards and directors’ remuneration 
We draw on resource dependency theory as it emphasizes the role of board in 
securing resources for the firm to grow and develop (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Firms with board diversity are likely to offer extensive networks and facilitate 
opportunities to obtain more resources that can help the firm to achieve strategic 
objectives (William and O’Reilly III, 1998).  
There are competing views on the relationship between women directors and 
remuneration, based on the contribution to the firm that women are seen to make. Hill 
et al. (2014) argue that women directors suffer from an invisible barrier that prevents 
them from attaining top corporate positions; and argue that negative stereotyping of 
women prevents them from being treated equally. This stereotyping includes the view 
that women are unable to contribute to the economy once they have a family 
(Elkinawy and Stater, 2011); and that they are less competent than men are and their 
job performance is below expectation.  
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Ferreira (2010) outlines several benefits of a diverse board. A diverse board is 
able to enhance creativity and provide different perspectives on tasks to hand. It can 
provide economies of scale, extending access to resources and connections through 
the various groups of board member.6 Ferreira (2010) notes that a diverse board is 
taken by employees as a sign of equality and job assurance for the future, and that 
firms gain social benefits in promoting women to the board. Women’s presence on a 
board increases accountability and improves communication between the board and 
stakeholders. In other words, it increases non-financial measures such as customer 
satisfaction, gender representation and corporate social responsibility (Terjesen et al., 
2009).In realizing the positive impact of women, thus there is need to increase its 
participation. Nevertheless, Broderick (2012) stress that to increase its participation, 
there is need to address its existing barriers, which include pay inequality.  
Terjesen et al. (2009) suggest that women notice different things than a male-only 
group, which can be carried away with big agendas. Their presence in the boardroom 
makes male directors change their behaviour: strong language is toned down and the 
atmosphere becomes more considered. This leads to more effective performance and 
better governance. The arguments raised by capital market papers (e.g. Elkinawy and 
Stater, 2011; Gul et al., 2011, 2013; Srinidhi et al., 2011) are rather similar. They 
suggest that women’s participation on corporate boards enhances decision making, 
                                                 
 
 
6 Economies of scale is defined as extension of production at a reducing cost, and in turns increases profit for the 
firms.  
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especially in unstructured and complex situations. Diverse boards are able to 
understand a diverse market better, so the input provided by a female component is 
beneficial for decision-making. The premise that there is a relationship between 
women directors and remuneration resides in their contribution to the firm.  
Ferreira (2010) outlines several costs of a diverse board. Conflict, displayed as 
lack of cooperation between two demographically different groups, reduces group 
cohesiveness; and directors who pursue their own preferences, choosing board 
members based on demographic characteristics, might not be best advancing the firm. 
The relationship is rather ambiguous: women may either contribute or not 
contribute to the firm. Therefore, based on the above arguments, we offer the 
following hypothesis stated in the alternative: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is an association between gender-diverse boards and the 
level of directors’ remuneration. 
 
3.2 Ethnically diverse boards and directors’ remuneration 
A director may be appointed on ethnic grounds for several reasons. Resource 
dependency theory suggests that such appointments are based on the needs of both 
human and social capital, usually to exploit special skills held only by certain ethnic 
groups (human capital) or to seek economies of scale via networking (social capital). 
Although both are applicable to the Malaysian setting, the demands of social capital 
are more likely. Westphal and Milton (2000) offer a perspective on this relationship. 
They argue that the influence of minorities on the board of directors is dependent on 
the influence and characteristics of the majority member on the board of directors. 
They argue that the network created by majority and minority directors provide a 
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basis for social cohesion, and thus reducing the likelihood of out-group categorisation. 
Overall, they argue that stronger connection created by minorities on board, will 
increase social integration and thus are able to exert more influence on the board 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000).   
 
In addition, agency theory suggests that ethnically diverse boards are expected to 
provide better monitoring, and thus reduce agency costs because these boards are 
likely to be more critical that the board which consist of directors of the same ethnic 
background (Carter et al., 2003).  
White (2004) suggests that the role of Bumiputras directors prior to the 
introduction of the NEP in 1971 was to provide protection to non-Bumiputras’ 
investments in the capital market, as Bumiputras were closely involved with the 
government. Recent empirical evidence suggests that this closeness still exists, 
although the reason for it may have changed. Gomez and Jomo (1999) document the 
existence of connections between firms and politicians in Malaysia, as well as 
between firms and the political parties that govern the country.  
Based on the argument from social capital, that Bumiputras directors’ presence 
on a board is due to networking and enhances economies of scale, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is an association between ethnically diverse boards and 
directors’ remuneration. 
 
Hill et al. (2014) examine the relationship between ethnically diverse executives 
and directors’ remuneration. Based on 10,060 firm-year observations over ten years 
beginning in 1996 for US firms, they find a positive and significant relationship 
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between ethnic CEOs and CEO compensation. Further, they find a positive and 
significant relationship between the proportion of ethnic directors and CEO 
compensation. Their result indicates that CEOs and directors of minority status, 
whether considered jointly as minorities or individually by ethnic status, are paid 
more than the CEOs of majority status (i.e., white males). The result suggests that 
ethnic CEOs and directors benefit from the value, rarity, and inimitability of their 
minority status such that they receive higher compensation relative to white males. 
 
3.3 Diverse boards and directors’ remuneration 
Given the opportunity Malaysia presents to measure both gender-diverse and 
ethnically diverse boards against remuneration, it would be remiss not to examine 
them simultaneously. We suggested earlier, drawing on resource dependency theory, 
that women on boards are able to provide extra assistance in terms of decision making 
although their contribution could be hampered by stereotyping. We also suggested an 
association between an ethnically diverse board and remuneration, based on the social 
capital argument that a positive relationship could exist. We now offer our third 
hypothesis, based on these arguments: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is an association between diverse boards and directors’ 
remuneration.  
 
4 Data and Research Methods 
This study is based on a sample of 1094 observations listed on the Main Bursa 
Malaysia from 2007 to 2009. Data on institutional ownership and corporate 
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governance variables were collected from annual reports available on the Bursa 
Malaysia website. Financial information was extracted from Compustat Global. 
As of 31 December 2009, 844 companies were listed in “Main Markets” on Bursa 
Malaysia. The sample size for this study is 365 randomly selected non-financial firms 
for years from 2007 to 2009 and total sample 1,094 observation.  In 2004, KLSE was 
renamed “Bursa Malaysia” which is consists of “Main Market” (Main and Second 
Board) and “ACE Market” (effecting starting 3 August 2009).  
The minimum paid-up capital for ACE companies is RM 2 million for technology 
and nontechnology companies with maximum of RM 20 million for technology 
incubator companies which is less than the Main market criteria for paid-up capital 
which is between RM 40 million and 60 million.7 
We included only cash-based compensation components for the sample period. 
Although disclosure of directors’ remuneration in Malaysia has significantly 
improved following the incorporation of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, 
the information is not available in electronic form and must be hand-collected from 
annual reports. We posit the following regression analysis, with the experimental 
variables in bold: 
 
LN (DIRREM) it = a0 + a1WOMENit + a2BUMIit + a3WOMEN X BUMIit + 
a4BODINDit + a5BODLOCKit + a6DUALITYit + a7POLCONit + a8INSTOWNit + 
                                                 
 
 
7 (http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/resources/download/brochure_listing_bursa.pdf) 
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a9FAMILYit + a10MKTCAPit + a11DEBTit + a12BIG4it + a13ROA (-1) it + a14ROR (-1)it 
+ a15STDROAit + a16MANOWNit + a17-22INDUSTRIESit + a23-25PERIODit + e it 
 
All the variables will be discussed in the sub-sections below.  
Since the data are pooled across firms over time, a panel analysis is used to 
estimate the relationships. The panel data have N x T observations, where t = 1 to 3 of 
each i = 1,..., N cross-sectional observations in the sample.  
4.1 Dependent variable(s) 
The main dependent variable for this study is total cash-based director 
remuneration (DIRREM), which consists of both executive directors’ (EXECREM) 
and non-executive directors’ remunerations (NEDREM). Murphy (1999) draws a 
distinction between cash remuneration, which includes base salary and annual bonus, 
and total remuneration, which also includes incentive components such as stock 
options and long-term incentive plans. The salary plus bonus remuneration measure, 
which is applied in this study, has been widely used in prior research (e.g. Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Ozkan, 2007, Abdul Wahab and Abdul Rahman, 2009). We further 
sub-categorise the remuneration for each executive and non-executive director into 
salary, fees, bonuses, and benefits.  
4.2 Independent variables  
4.2.1 Gender-diverse boards 
As do other studies (Gul et al., 2011, 2013; Srinidhi et al., 2011), we 
operationalised our gender-diverse board as the proportion of women directors on 
board (WOMEN).  
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4.2.2 Ethnically diverse boards  
Like ethnic diversity studies (e.g. Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Hill et al., 2014) we 
opted for the proportion of Bumiputras directors (BUMI) on board as our ethnic-
diverse variable. 
 
4.3 Corporate governance variables
8,9
 
4.3.1 Board independence  
We included a corporate governance variable, which is the board of directors’ 
level of independence (BOARDIND), widely believed to play an important role in 
monitoring management. Non-executive directors who are not full employees of the 
firm are believed to play a larger role in monitoring managers than executive directors 
(Ozkan, 2007). We posit a negative relationship between BOARDIND and DIRREM.  
Previous research has produced mixed results on the relation between board 
independence and directors’ remuneration. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that firms 
with more outsiders on their boards award directors more equity-based compensation. 
                                                 
 
 
8When studying the association between corporate governance and directors’ remuneration, we treat governance 
structures as exogenous. Our approach is the same as that of Core et al. (1999) where they observe that 
‘‘Following most prior empirical research in this area, we treat the board and ownership structures as exogenous, 
when economic theory would argue that these variables are endogenous.’’ This well-established approach of 
treating governance structures as exogenous is reasonable, in the sense that some institutional features of 
contracting cause governance characteristics to be ‘‘sticky.’’ For example, directors serve for fixed terms, so 
naturally it takes time to change board members to adjust to a changed operating environment. Consistent with 
many prior studies, we argue that it is difficult for firms to have optimal governance structures at all times (e.g., 
see Larcker et al., 2007). 
9 Our Hausman-Wu tests for joint endogeneity suggest that at least one of the variables is endogenously 
determined.  
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Nevertheless, when the CEO’s power over the board increases, compensation 
provides weaker incentives to monitor. Brick et al. (2006) find that the percentage of 
inside directors are significantly negatively related to director cash and total 
compensation. They find that highly paid directors are more likely to be busy and 
serve on interlocking boards. Thus, they conclude that excess director compensation 
exist when there is poor governance structures Ozkan (2007) finds a positive 
relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and CEO 
compensation, suggesting that non-executive directors are less efficient in monitoring 
than executive directors. Gregory-Smith (2012) finds no evidence of a relationship 
between CEO pay and director independence, and challenges the theory of managerial 
power.  
4.3.2 Board interlock 
Multiple directorships increase the level of remuneration (Hallock, 1997; Sapp, 
2008) when cronyism exists: that is, when, directors on one board are invited to sit on 
other boards by members who know them and their quality of work. Core et al.’s 
(1999) finding that CEO remuneration is higher when the board includes interlocking 
directorship supports this. Booth and Deli (1996) state that if directors serve on 
different boards it enhances their reputation and prestige, and leads to higher director 
remuneration packages. A study by Fich and White (2003) shows remuneration is 
positively related to the number of mutually interlocking directors on a board. A 
recent study by Andreas et al. (2012) finds a higher probability of performance-based 
pay on boards composed of directors who serve on multiple boards simultaneously, 
reflecting the common concern that having too many other mandates jeopardises the 
monitoring function of the board, as Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest. We posit a 
positive relationship between interlock (BODLOCK) and level of remuneration. 
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4.3.3 Non-Duality  
Duality constitutes a concentration of power given to the CEO over the board of 
directors, reducing the ability of the board to monitor and control management 
(Harrison et al., 1988; Jensen, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). From the perspective 
of agency theory, having one individual in charge of both implementation and control 
is inconsistent with the concept of checks and balances (Kim & Buchanan, 2008). A 
CEO who has total control of the decision-making process may use the opportunity to 
increase his/her remuneration package (Sapp, 2008).  
A study by Conyon (1997) which examines top directors’ remuneration in a 
sample of 213 UK companies in 1988 and 1993 shows that separating the role of the 
CEO and Chairman has no effect on top directors’ remuneration: a position consistent 
with Conyon and Leech (1994), who find that duality did not have an effect on 
remuneration growth in the mid-1980s. Indeed, a study by Brick et al. (2006) finds 
that directors receive larger remuneration if a firm has a different CEO and 
chairperson. This larger compensation may reflect an environment of weak 
governance (cronyism). We operationalised this variable as one if there is a separation 
between CEO and Chairperson (NDUALITY). 
4.4 Institutional variables  
4.4.1 Political connections  
Political connections are an important element of Malaysia’s capital market. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the contribution of such connections to the 
development of the capital market, from Gomez and Jomo’s (1999) which provides 
anecdotal evidence of connections between firms and political figures to the seminal 
work of Johnson and Mitton (2003) which examines the impact of capital control on 
firms that have political connections.  
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Chang and Wong (2004) state that political involvement in a firm is established to 
pursue political interests and social objectives. It also acts to correct market failures, 
which in this case would be by monitoring directors’ remuneration. Abdul Wahab and 
Abdul Rahman (2009) provide some initial evidence on the relationship between 
political connections and directors’ remuneration and find no evidence to suggest such 
a relationship exists. Garcia-Meca (2016) suggests that the relationship between 
political connections and remuneration is ambiguous. She argues that according 
resource dependency theory; political connections could assist firms in obtaining 
resources and cope for various external uncertainties. Therefore, this argument 
suggests a positive relationship between political connections and remuneration.  
On the other hand, based on the agency theory, connected CEOs may utilise 
political resources for themselves, not for the shareholders. The information 
asymmetry problem caused by political connections may affect key strategic 
decisions, and hence remuneration policy, a key determinant of corporate governance 
(Garcia-Meca, 2016).  
We operationalized this variable by assigning 1 if the firms are politically 
connected based on the same premise of Johnson and Mitton (2003), and 0 
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otherwise.10  In addition, we identify government link firms under the Khazanah 
Berhad as politically connected firms.11 
4.4.2 Institutional Ownership  
Our next institutional variable is the percentage of ownership for top five (5) 
institutional investors. Institutional investors are expected to play a fiduciary role and 
act in the best interest of their contributors (Hawley and Williams, 1997). In addition, 
Jennings (2005) argues that the size of the institutional investors could act as an 
important tool to exert influence over their investments. The expectations of such role 
for institutional investors in Malaysia are no different. In addition, the establishment 
of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group in 2001 in Malaysia acts as a catalyst for 
institutional investors in Malaysia to play a more active role in corporate governance 
in Malaysia.  
 Evidence of the governance role of institutional investors in Malaysia is rather 
consistent. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. Ammer and Abdul Rahman (2009) find 
firms targeted by institutional investors experience abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of initiated shareholders’ activism. Institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) which is the top five (5) institutional investors’ shareholdings in a firm. 
                                                 
 
 
10 Johnson and Mitton (2003) rely on the analysis of Gomez and Jomo (1999) by identifying officers or major 
shareholders with close relationships with key government officials, primarily Tun Mahathir, Tun Daim and 
Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim.  
11 Founded in 1993, Khazanah Berhad is owned by the Malaysian government to manage selected commercial 
assets of the government and undertakes strategic investments on behalf of the nation.  
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Since institutional investors are expected to monitor firms and present themselves as 
another agency cost-reducing medium, we argue a negative relationship should exist 
between institutional ownership and directors’ remuneration. 
4.4.3 Family  
Our third institutional variable is the proportion of family members in the board 
of directors, a proxy of family firms in Malaysia. Due to the uniqueness of power and 
control dynamics in family owned firms, one disadvantage of family firm according to 
agency theory is the fact that it leads to increased focus on personal benefit and 
decreased concern with maximizing profits for minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 
2002; Carney, 2005; Cheung et al., 2006, Hanazaki and Liu, 2007).  On the contrary, 
one fundamental characteristic of family firms that influences type II agency problem 
is that there is a great sense of family attachment in these firms and family members 
have control of the firms with majority ownership. Given that, family members have 
very high level of trust, are supportive, have high sense of belonging, able to manage 
rivalries, conflicts, and have high level of confidence.  
The family ownership brings in power and control to increase personal wealth 
via excessive remuneration, which is influenced by the uniqueness of family firm. 
Similarly, the positive relationship between family ownership and director 
remuneration is in the altruism issue, through which the parents estate and share 
transfer intention moderate the effect of incentive payments (Schulze et al. 2001).  
Furthermore, they include emotion in the remuneration which influences the 
perceptions on executives’ competency levels (Moores and Craig 2008). The fact that 
family members incorporate the firm, where they are also the founder, this prerogative 
gives them the authorization to utilize the profit’s portion for personal interest such as 
assigning and distributing higher remuneration. If higher remuneration does not affect 
firm’s loss or potentially affect by insignificant margins, the family members may use 
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their authority to derive financial benefit (Chourou 2010).  Wiwattanakantang (2001) 
notices that the majority shareholder has ability to pay out the firms’ cash flow to 
themselves via paying higher salaries and dividend and also hold top position in 
management though they are not capable.  
Findings of previous studies show that there is a positive relationship between 
ownership and remuneration (Basu et al. 2007; Cheung et al. 2005; Thillainathan 
1999). Basu et al. (2007) in particular find that the higher ownership positively impact 
to the higher remuneration to executive. Meanwhile, Cheung et al. (2005) in their 
study of 412 firms in Hong Kong explain cash emoluments received by executives’ 
are linked to their shareholding in the firm. Study by Thillainathan (1999), on the 
other hand exhibit that the family ownership can manipulate the remuneration through 
cross holding and pyramids; two patterns that are common in Malaysia. Essentially, 
He (2008) explains that cross holding and pyramid can maximize the control of 
majority shareholder while increasing private benefits. This ultimately is the expense 
for minority shareholder due to fewer dividends distributed.  
 
 
4.5 Control variables  
Researchers’ arguments that remuneration increases as firm size increases are 
based on the increasing complexity of the job at larger firms (Murphy, 1999): bigger 
firms require managers who are particularly talented and are willing to offer them 
higher remuneration. Previous studies have similarly linked firm size and directors’ 
compensation; whereby larger firms are expected to provide larger remuneration 
packages for their directors.  
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We control for firm size by using the natural log of market capitalisation 
(MKTCAP). Next, we control for the level of debt by including the ratio of total debt 
to total equity (DEBT); a positive relationship is predicted. Then we control for the 
level of audit quality in a firm. Our proxy for audit quality is auditor size, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big Four (4) firm (BIG4).  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that directors in better performing firms receive 
greater levels of remuneration. This is consistent with the agency paradigm that 
emphasis that managers are self-serving and those formal mechanisms such as 
monitoring and reward structures are meant to align the incentives of top managers 
and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983.) Like other 
studies (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Ozkan, 2007) we include firm performance 
measures as determinants for director remuneration, consisting of both accounting and 
market measures of performance. Our accounting measure of performance is lagged 
return on assets (ROA (-1)), which is total earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets, while lagged market-adjusted continuously compounded annual share 
return (ROR (-1)) is our market measure of performance. We predict a positive 
relationship between performance measures (ROA (-1) and ROR (-1)) and DIRREM. 
To control for risk in returns, we include a standard deviation of return on assets 
measured in a five-year rolling period (STDROA). The next control variable is 
managerial ownership (MANOWN). Directors with a low level of shareholdings are 
more likely to be motivated by incentives provided through remuneration (Ozkan, 
2007), and therefore we predict a negative relationship between MANOWN and 
DIRREM. Industry dummies (INDUSTRIES), are included to control for industry 
effects. Finally, we include year dummies (PERIOD) for any unobserved effect during 
the test period.   
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[Table 1 about here] 
4.6 Sample description  
Panel A of Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics of dependent variables for 
this study. The average total directors’ remuneration (DIRREM_RM) is RM 2.176 
million. The average executive directors’ remuneration (EXECREM_RM) is RM 
1.915 million, while non-executive directors’ remuneration (NEDREM_RM) averages 
RM 259,000. The components for executive directors’ remuneration of executive 
salary (EXECSAL_RM), executive fees (EXECFEES_RM), executive benefits 
(EXECBEN_RM) and executive bonuses (EXECBON_RM) register a mean of RM 
1.462 million, RM 91,000, RM 185,000 and RM 176,000 respectively. The 
components of non-executive directors’ remuneration of fees (NEDFEES_RM), 
benefits (NEDBEN_RM) and bonuses (NEDBON_RM) record means of RM 
234,000; RM 14,000 and RM 12,000 respectively. Executive director bonuses 
represent around 8.09 percent of total cash remuneration, while non-executive 
directors’ bonuses amount to a mere 0.55 percent of total cash remuneration.  
Panel B of Table 2 tabulates the descriptive for the independent variables.12 The 
number of women directors on boards (WOMEN_BOD) averages 1.597 and ranges 
between nil to ten. The proportion of women directors (WOMEN) averages a mere 
                                                 
 
 
12The average board size for this study is 7 (7.11) directors. Shakir (2008) find that between 1999 -2005 the mean 
board size in Malaysia is 7 directors with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 13 directors. These figures are 
consistent with figures reported by Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Dogan and Smyth (2002) and Abdullah (2004) and 
as can be seen, varies little over the period under study. 
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0.195 (19.5 per cent), lower than the 30 per cent targeted by the Malaysian 
government. Our sample firms record on average 2.928 Bumiputras directors 
(BOD_BUMI), in a range between one and ten. Bumiputras directors make up, on 
average, 0.415 (41.5 per cent) of the total number of directors. Our findings differ 
from Low et al. (2015), which records 10 percent for the period of 2012 and 2013.  
Panel C of Table 2 presents the descriptive for the corporate governance variables 
in this study. The proportion of independent directors (BOD_IND) averages 0.457 
(45.7 per cent). Our second corporate governance variable is BODLOCK, which is the 
proportion of those who hold multiple directorships. BODLOCK averages 0.283 (28.3 
per cent) while our third corporate governance variable, NDUALITY averages 0.597 
(59.7 per cent).  
Panel D tabulates the institutional variables. 44.6 per cent of the sample firms are 
politically connected (POLCON). The institutional ownership (INSTOWN) averages 
12.931 per cent and ranges between nil to 73.77 per cent. The average number of 
family members on boards of directors is 21.3 per cent.  
The descriptive figures for our control variables are presented in panel E. The 
natural log transformation of market capitalisation (MKTCAP) averages 18.57. The 
ratio of total debt to total equity (DEBT) is 1.032, and 47.3 per cent of firms are 
audited by a Big Four (BIG4) auditing firm. Lagged returns on assets (ROA (-1)) and 
market adjusted returns (ROR (-1)) average 0.034 and 0.052 respectively. The 
standard deviation on return on assets (STDROA) records a mean of 5.196 while the 
direct managerial shareholding (MANOWN) is 7.281 per cent.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
5 Results  
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5.1 Correlations  
The Pearson and Spearman rank-correlations between DIRREM and WOMEN 
are 0.160 and 0.144 respectively, both significant at the one per cent level as 
presented in Table 3. The correlations between BUMI and DIRREM are -0.079 
(Pearson) and -0.130 (Spearman-rank), both significant at the one per cent level. We 
find significant correlations between INSTOWN and WOMEN for both Pearson 
(0.103) and Spearman-rank (0.102). However, we find no significant correlations 
between FAMILY and WOMEN (both Pearson and Spearman-rank), and INSTOWN 
and BUMI.   We find positive and significant correlations (both Pearson and 
Spearman-rank) between both of our performance measures and DIRREM. This 
finding lend initial support of the role of firm performance and remuneration in 
aligning interest between managers and shareholders.              
We find significant correlations between all variables against DIRREM (both 
Pearson and Spearman), with the exception of BODIND and BODLOCK. 
Furthermore, we find significant correlation between WOMEN with ROA (-1) (0.061) 
and ROR (-1) (0.056), but only for Spearman-rank correlations.  The overall 
correlations between variables suggest that there is no serious multicollinearity issue. 
In addition, the subsequent VIFs tests for the regressions suggest no multicollinearity 
issue among the test variables.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2 Multivariate analysis  
Table 4 represents the main regression results. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are regressions 
without the interaction WOMEN×BUMI for natural log transformation for total 
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directors’ remuneration (DIRREM), executive directors’ remuneration (EXECREM) 
and non-executive directors’ remuneration (NEDREM) respectively. We find a 
positive and significant relationship between WOMEN and DIRREM (0.442, t=2.169, 
p<0.05) and a significantly negative relationship between BUMI and DIRREM (-
0.571, t=-2.061, p<0.05), tabulated in column 1. The adjusted R2 for these regressions 
are 22.1, 9.4 and 23.4 percent respectively. On average, the regressions explain from 
9.4 percent to 22.1 percent of variations in the determinants of directors’ remuneration 
in Malaysia.  
The positive relationship between the proportion of women directors and 
directors’ remuneration may suggest that increase in directors’ remuneration is due to 
increase in women’s participation’ in board. This positive relationship supports the 
argument raised by Ferreira (2010) that a diverse board are able to provide a different 
perspective on business strategies. Further, this finding supports Terjesen et al. (2009) 
argument that women directors’ presence increases accountability and improves 
communication on board of directors. Our results also support the arguments raised by 
Elkinawy and Stater (2011), Gul et al. (2011) and Gul et al. (2013) that female 
participation on board enhances decision making. We view the positive relationship as 
recognition towards the women directors on the board. In addition, our positive 
findings support the theoretical argument raised by the resource dependency theory 
that suggest the women directors are being sought to enhance performance of the 
firms.  
The negative relationship between the proportion of Bumiputras directors and 
total directors’ remuneration could suggest that their role is to secure networking and 
connections via (possible) Bumiputras participation in the government. This negative 
finding might also demonstrate lack of cohesion between ethnic groups (Ferreira, 
2010).  
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However, we find varied results when we separate DIRREM into EXECREM and 
NEDREM. We find no support of a significant relationship between WOMEN and 
EXECREM, shown in column 3, but a positive and significant relationship between 
WOMEN and NEDREM (0.835, t=3.711, p<0.01), tabulated in column 5. We find a 
significant and negative relationship between BUMI and EXECREM (-3.193, t=-
4.661, p<0.01) but no evidence of impact on NEDREM, shown in columns 3 and 5 
respectively. These differences in results are somewhat interesting. The negative and 
significant relationship between BUMI and EXECREM suggest that their play a 
major part in day-to-day operation of the business, and as such proven to be a 
contribution to firms’ performance. However, the positive relationship between 
WOMEN and NEDREM could suggest that women directors are being rewarded for 
their monitoring role and provide significant contribution to the firms.  
We extended the analyses by including the interaction WOMEN×BUMI as 
presented in columns 2, 4, and 6. We find a positive and significant relationship 
between WOMEN×BUMI (2.760, t=1.702, p<0.10) and DIRREM. This suggests the 
negative relationship observed earlier between BUMI and DIRREM is weakened by 
the presence of women directors. These results are consistent for total executive 
(EXECREM) and total non-executive (NEDREM) remuneration. What we can deduce 
from this is that the role of women directors in the corporate sector is largely due to 
their ability to provide services that are beneficial to the firms’ economies of scale 
(Ferreira, 2010).  
We find no evidence to suggest that our corporate governance variables 
(BOD_IND; BODLOCK and NDUALITY) influence DIRREM. However, we find a 
significant and negative relationship between NDUALITY and EXCREM (-0.414, t=-
2.239, p<0.05), suggesting that the separation of CEO and chairperson plays a 
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monitoring role and demonstrates effective governance, as shown in column 3. In 
contrast, we find a positive and significant impact of NDUALITY on NEDREM.  
As for the institutional variables, we find a positive and significant impact of 
INSTOWN and FAMILY on DIRREM, tabulated in column 1, and positive and 
significant coefficients for MKTCAP, DEBT, BIG4 and ROA (-1), also tabulated in 
column 1. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for regressions in Table 5 ranges 
between 1.441 and 2.773, suggesting no multicollinearity issue. 13 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
We then performed the same analysis for executive directors’ remuneration 
components: executive salary (EXECSAL), executive fees (EXECFEES), benefits 
(EXECBEN) and bonuses (EXECBON). As shown in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 
5, we find a positive and significant impact of WOMEN only on EXECBEN (2.972, 
t=2.132, p>0.05). We find negative and significant impacts of BUMI on EXECSAL (-
2.761, t=-3.250, p<0.01), EXECFEES (-3.671, t=-1.932, p<0.10) and EXECBON (-
4.017, t=-2.033, p<0.05). Our extended analysis finds that women directors weaken 
the negative relationship between BUMI and EXECSAL.  
 
                                                 
 
 
13 The VIFs for ROA is 2.498 and ROR is 2.526, which is lower than 10, and thus it is still within acceptable range 
for correlation. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
  
Table 6 tabulates the regression analysis for non-executive directors’ 
remuneration components: non-executive fees (NEDFEES), benefits (NEDBEN) and 
bonuses (NEDBON). Our analysis suggests that the proportion of women directors 
(WOMEN) has a positive and significant impact on non-executive directors’ fees 
(NEDFEES) and benefits (NEDBEN), but not on bonuses (NEDBON). We did not 
find a relationship existing between BUMI and any of the non-executive directors’ 
remuneration components. As presented in column 2, we find the negative 
relationship between BUMI and NEDFEES (3.293, t=1.807, p<0.10) is weaker with 
the presence of women directors. Since non-executives largely receive fees as 
opposed to benefits or bonuses, this finding is important in highlighting the role of 
women directors in the corporate sector on remuneration. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
5.3 Tokenism to critical mass 
In the spirit of studies that examine the impact of minorities in corporate 
boardrooms (e.g. Torchia et al., 2011), we extended the analysis by considering the 
incremental impact of women directors’ participation on directors’ remuneration. 
Initial argument on women in most corporate boards, there is only one woman or a 
small minority of women. As such, they are often considered as tokens (Torchia et al., 
2011). In addition, drawing from the critical mass theory (Granovetter, 1978), this 
section addresses the question of whether an increased number of women directors 
results in the build-up of critical mass that substantially contributes to firm innovation. 
By identifying different minorities of women directors (one woman, two women and 
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at least three women), we test whether, and to what extent, they could have an impact 
on the level of firm innovation. 
The concept of ‘tokenism’ grasp the idea when minorities (gender or ethnic) are 
marginalised when the presence are modest. Tokenism could lead to stereotyping 
(Kanter, 1977a, b; Powell et al., 2002) and thus being perceived negatively, often 
doubted and not trusted by the organisation or other managers (Torchia et al., 2011). 
Torchia et al. (2011) state that, as a result from being labelled as ‘tokens’ create 
discomfort, isolation and self-doubt, interference with performance and face 
additional pressure to succeed.  
On the other hand, critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977a, b) suggest that when the 
size of the sub-groups reaches a critical mass, a qualitative change will take place in 
the nature of group interactions. In addition, Kanter (1977a, b) argues that when the 
size of the minority group increases, it gains trust, and the majority benefits from the 
resources, the minority brings to the organization.  
We opt similar approach to Erkut et al. (2008) and Konrad et al. (2008) that 
suggest that critical mass of women directors is achieved when board of directors 
have at least three women. The aim was to test if at least three women directors could 
constitute a desirable critical mass in a firm. We operationalised WOMEN=1 to takes 
the value of 1 if the women directors number only one, zero otherwise. Next, we 
operationalised WOMEN=2, an indicator variable if the women director’s number 
two, zero otherwise. The variables WOMEN=1 and WOMEN=2 represent tokenism 
of women’s participation on the board. Next, we operationalised WOMEN>=3 to 
takes the value of 1 if the women directors number three or more, zero otherwise, by 
which to represent critical mass. 
As presented in column 1 of Table 7, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between WOMEN>=3 and DIRREM (0.228, t=2.346, p<0.05), 
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suggesting that having at least three women directors is essential if they are to be 
effective in providing services to the firm.14  
The role of critical mass for WOMEN directors is only significant for NEDREM 
as the interaction term; (WOMEN=>3) X BUMI is positive and significant (2.419, 
t=2.653, p<0.05) as shown on column 6 of Table 7. The study could not find similar 
findings for either DIRREM or EXECREM.  
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The concept of tokenism to critical mass can also be applied to the number of 
Bumiputras directors. The premise of the test whether at least three Bumiputras 
directors constitute a desirable critical mass in a firm. We operationalised BUMI=1 
that takes the value of 1 if the Bumiputras director number only one, zero otherwise. 
Next, we operationalised BUMI=2, an indicator variable if the Bumiputras directors 
number to two, zero otherwise. The variables BUMI=1 and BUMI=2 represent 
tokenism for Bumiputras directors participation on the board. Next, we 
operationalised BUMI=>3 to take a value of 1 if the Bumiputras directors number 
three or more, zero otherwise in which this represent critical mass.  
Similar to WOMEN, we find that Bumiputras directors (BUMI) achieved critical 
mass as presented in column 1 of Table 8 (BUMI=>3; 0.249, t=2.664; p<0.05). In 
addition, the interaction between WOMEN X (BUMI=>3), resulted in a positive and 
                                                 
 
 
14 There are 27 percent of sample firms that have at least 3 or more women directors.  
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significant coefficient (0.784, t=1.726, p<0.10) and this suggest that both the presence 
of women directors and at least three Bumiputras directors have positive effect on 
remuneration.  
The role of critical mass for BUMI is positive and significant for DIRREM as 
shown by the interaction term; WOMEN X (BUMI=>3) at column 2 of table 8 (0.784, 
t=1.726, p<0.10). We find similar finding when it comes to EXECREM as the critical 
mass interaction with WOMEN is positive and significant (2.333, t=2.020, p<0.05).  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
6 Conclusion 
Malaysia represents a unique setting for investigating the relationship between 
board diversity and directors’ remuneration. We defined board diversity as the 
proportion of women and Bumiputras directors on the board. After controlling for 
other determinants of remuneration such as size, corporate governance variables, risk 
and other institutional variables, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between women directors and directors’ remuneration, but a negative and significant 
relationship between the proportion of Bumiputras directors and remuneration. The 
main implication of this finding is the positive effect of firms hiring more women in 
top management roles. In addition, the negative effect of Bumiputras suggest that 
their role is to offer political expedience to the board and thus provide economies of 
scale through their status to the country.  
Our extended analysis suggests an interesting finding, that the negative effect of 
Bumiputras directors on remuneration is weakened by the presence of women 
directors. The result provide evidence that the presence of women directors give 
positive effect to the firms. Therefore, the government policy announced in June 2011 
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to increase female representation on all board of directors is considered as timely and 
crucial as to identify the possible balance of demographic differences in the boards.  
Our findings suggest that diverse boards especially in term of gender are important in 
providing optimal support and services to an organisation.  
The findings of this study provide implication to the regulators to provide 
appropriate and optimum remuneration to compensate women on their good 
performance. Our study provides a stepping-stone for future research and possible 
government implication on having demographically diverse boards’ structures. The 
findings strengthen the government argument on having more women on board. In 
addition, further studies could be done to investigate further the role of Bumiputras in 
the Malaysian capital market.  
The study is not without any limitations. First, we do not have the individual 
remuneration data for each director as such data usually not made available in the 
annual reports. Such unavailability limits the analysis to investigate further the role of 
both women and Bumiputras directors. 
 
 
Data availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.  
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Table 1: Operational definition of variables 
Variables  Sign Definition Source 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
DIRREM_RM Total Directors’ remuneration Annual reports 
EXECREM_RM Total Executive Directors’ remuneration Annual reports 
EXECSAL_RM 
 
Total executive directors’ salary Annual reports 
EXECFEES_RM Total executive directors’ fees Annual reports 
EXECBEN_RM Total executive directors’ benefits Annual reports 
EXECBON_RM Total executive directors’ bonuses Annual reports 
NEDREM_RM Total non-executive directors’ remuneration Annual reports 
NEDFEES_RM 
 
Total non-executive directors’ fees Annual reports 
NEDBEN_RM 
 
Total non-executive directors’ benefits  Annual reports 
NEDBON_RM Total non-executive directors’ bonuses Annual reports 
DIRREM Natural log transformation of Total Directors’ remuneration Annual reports 
EXECREM Natural log transformation of Total Executive Directors’ remuneration Annual reports 
EXECSAL 
 
Natural log transformation of Total executive directors’ salary Annual reports 
EXECFEES Natural log transformation of Total executive directors’ fees Annual reports 
EXECBEN Natural log transformation of Total executive directors’ benefits Annual reports 
EXECBON Natural log transformation of Total executive directors’ bonuses Annual reports 
NEDREM Natural log transformation of Total non-executive directors’ remuneration Annual reports 
NEDFEES 
 
Natural log transformation of Total non-executive directors’ fees Annual reports 
NEDBEN 
 
Natural log transformation of Total non-executive directors’ benefits  Annual reports 
NEDBON Natural log transformation of Total non-executive directors’ bonuses Annual reports 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
WOMEN_BOD Number of women directors on board Annual reports 
WOMEN 
 
The proportion of women directors on board Annual reports 
BOD_BUMI 
 
The number of Bumiputras directors on board Annual reports 
BUMI The proportion of Bumiputras directors on board Annual reports 
Panel C: Corporate Governance Variables 
BOD_IND The proportion of independent directors on board Annual reports 
BODLOCK 
 
The proportion of directors that hold multiple directorship Annual reports 
NDUALITY 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman 
functions are held by separate individual Annual reports 
Panel D: Institutional Variables 
POLCON  An indicator variable, 1 for politically connected firms, 0 otherwise Johnson and 
Mitton (2003) 
INSTOWN % ownership by top 5 institutional investors Annual reports 
FAMILY 
 
The proportion of family members on the board of directors Annual reports 
Panel E: Control Variables 
 MKTCAP  Natural log transformation of market capitalisation Compustat 
Global 
DEBT  Total debt over total equity Compustat 
Global 
BIG4  An indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 
auditor, zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
ROA(-1)  Lagged return on assets Compustat 
Global 
ROR(-1)  Lagged market adjusted returns Compustat 
Global 
STDROA  Standard deviation of return on assets (5 years) Compustat 
Global 
MANOWN  Direct managerial ownership Annual reports 
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Table 2: Descriptive Analysis (n=1094) 
  
 
    
 
Mean Percentage Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Dependent Variables       
DIRREM_RM (‘000) 2176 - 1427 70347 51 4418 
EXECREM_RM (‘000) 1916  88.05 1163 69621 51 4333 
EXECSAL_RM (‘000) 1462 67.19 921 68851 0 4015 
EXECFEES_RM (‘000) 92 4.23 24 2015 0 209 
EXECBEN_RM (‘000) 186 8.55 39 38166 0 1217 
EXECBON_RM (‘000) 176 8.09 0 6948 0 506 
NEDREM_RM (‘000) 259 11.90 162 3332 0 335 
NEDFEES_RM (‘000) 234 10.75 155 2498 0 268 
NEDBEN_RM (‘000) 14 0.64 0 676 0 47 
NEDBON_RM (‘000) 12 0.55 0 1466 0 89 
DIRREM 14.128  14.171 18.069 10.840 0.910 
EXECREM 13.672  13.967 18.059 0.000 2.172 
EXECSAL 13.224  13.734 18.047 0.000 2.692 
EXECFEES 6.699  10.086 14.516 0.000 5.579 
EXECBEN 7.533  10.571 17.457 0.000 5.562 
EXECBON 4.668  0.000 15.754 0.000 5.997 
NEDREM 11.976  11.995 15.019 0.000 1.090 
NEDFEES 11.896  11.950 14.731 0.000 1.135 
NEDBEN 2.595  0.000 13.424 0.000 4.483 
NEDBON 0.958  0.000 14.198 0.000 3.064 
Panel B: Independent Variables       
WOMEN_BOD 1.597  1.000 10.000 0.000 1.825 
WOMEN 0.195  0.167 0.714 0.000 0.193 
BOD_BUMI 2.928  3.000 10.000 1.000 1.066 
BUMI 0.415  0.429 1.000 0.125 0.129 
Panel C: Corporate Governance Variables      
BOD_IND 0.457  0.429 0.857 0.143 0.127 
BODLOCK 0.283  0.250 1.000 0.000 0.217 
NDUALITY 0.597  1.000 1.000 0.000 0.491 
Panel D: Institutional Variables       
POLCON 0.446  0.000 1.000 0.000 0.497 
INSTOWN 12.931  7.531 73.770 0.000 14.199 
FAMILY 0.213  0.000 1.000 0.000 0.245 
Panel E: Control Variables       
MKTCAP 18.570  18.379 21.823 11.747 0.954 
DEBT 1.032  0.663 9.820 0.000 1.165 
BIG4 0.473  0.000 1.000 0.000 0.499 
ROA(-1) 0.034  0.038 0.775 -0.694 0.105 
ROR(-1) 0.052  0.065 2.907 -1.962 0.262 
STDROA 5.196  3.677 38.871 0.000 5.170 
MANOWN 7.281  0.000 61.390 0.000 13.952 
      
Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions of variables. 
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Table 4: Main Regressions  
  DIRREM   DIRREM   EXECREM   EXECREM   NEDREM   NEDREM 
 Variable 1   2   3   4   5   6 
 C 9.511 
 
9.702 
 
10.706 
 
11.225 
 
5.213 
 
5.461 
  12.626 *** 12.785 *** 5.745 *** 5.979 *** 6.284 *** 6.534 *** 
WOMEN 0.442 
 
-0.688 
 
0.666 
 
-2.405 
 
0.835 
 
-0.635 
  2.169 ** -0.991 
 
1.321 
 
-1.399 
 
3.711 *** -0.859 
BUMI -0.571 
 
-0.905 
 
-3.193 
 
-4.101 
 
-0.429 
 
-0.864 
  -2.061 ** -2.622 ** -4.661 *** -4.802 *** -1.403 
 
-2.266 ** 
WOMEN×BUMI   2.760 
 
  7.500 
 
  3.591 
    1.702 *   1.868 *   2.095 ** 
BOD_IND -0.138 
 
-0.096 
 
0.172 
 
0.286 
 
-0.367 
 
-0.313 
  -0.480 
 
-0.333 
 
0.241 
 
0.399 
 
-1.162 
 
-0.988 
BODLOCK -0.062 
 
-0.066 
 
0.004 
 
-0.007 
 
0.074 
 
0.069 
  -0.34 
 
-0.363 
 
0.008 
 
-0.016 
 
0.37 
 
0.345 
NDUALITY -0.099 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.414 
 
-0.414 
 
0.35 
 
0.35 
  -1.323 
 
-1.325 
 
-2.239 ** -2.244 ** 4.269 *** 4.283 *** 
POLCON 0.053 
 
0.052 
 
0.054 
 
0.052 
 
0.159 
 
0.159 
  0.679 
 
0.674 
 
0.28 
 
0.274 
 
1.879 * 1.879 * 
INSTOWN 0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.009 
 
0.009 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
  2.235 ** 2.294 ** 1.328 
 
1.391 
 
1.339 
 
1.41 
FAMILY 0.770 
 
0.755 
 
1.408 
 
1.368 
 
-0.448 
 
-0.467 
  4.405 *** 4.325 *** 3.264 *** 3.175 *** -2.332 ** -2.437 ** 
MKTCAP 0.231 
 
0.228 
 
0.178 
 
0.170 
 
0.353 
 
0.349 
  5.72 *** 5.648 *** 1.784 * 1.700 * 7.969 *** 7.897 *** 
DEBT 0.080 
 
0.077 
 
0.147 
 
0.137 
 
0.031 
 
0.027 
  2.773 *** 2.652 ** 2.044 ** 1.912 * 0.985 
 
0.843 
BIG4 0.267 
 
0.263 
 
0.182 
 
0.168 
 
0.241 
 
0.235 
  3.890 *** 3.823 *** 1.06 
 
0.983 
 
3.128 *** 3.052 *** 
ROA(-1) 1.112 
 
1.151 
 
0.431 
 
0.536 
 
1.291 
 
1.341 
  2.462 ** 2.550 ** 0.378 
 
0.471 
 
2.428 ** 2.529 ** 
ROR(-1) 0.256 
 
0.245 
 
0.433 
 
0.404 
 
0.015 
 
0.001 
  1.350 
 
1.294 
 
0.912 
 
0.852 
 
0.072 
 
0.006 
STDROA -0.008 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.02 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
  -1.257 
 
-1.343 
 
-1.185 
 
-1.278 
 
0.751 
 
0.657 
MANOWN -0.004 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
  -1.158 
 
-1.076 
 
-0.277 
 
-0.187 
 
0.407 
 
0.506 
            
 Industry & 
Period Fixed 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.221 
 
0.224 
 
0.094 
 
0.098 
 
0.234 
 
0.238 
 F-statistic 15.09 *** 14.722 *** 6.172 *** 6.187 *** 16.188 *** 15.838 *** 
VIF (regression) 1.441 
 
2.763 
 
1.445 
 
2.773 
 
1.461 
 
2.709 
                         
Please refer Table 1 for operational definitions. Significant p-values are bold.*,** and *** represents significant levels of 10, 5 
and 1 per cent respectively. 
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Table6: Regression analysis (non-executive directors’ remuneration) 
  NEDFEES   NEDFEES   NEDBEN   NEDBEN   NEDBON   NEDBON 
Variable 1   2   3   4   5   6 
C 5.962 
 
6.190 
 
-15.045 
 
-15.344 
 
-6.064 
 
-5.981 
 
6.914 *** 7.119 *** -3.786 *** -3.825 *** -2.152 ** -2.103 ** 
WOMEN 0.777 
 
-0.572 
 
2.935 
 
4.705 
 
-0.148 
 
-0.638 
 
3.316 *** -0.729 
 
2.736 ** 1.280 
 
-0.194 
 
-0.246 
 BUMI -0.379 
 
-0.778 
 
-0.397 
 
0.126 
 
1.523 
 
1.378 
 
-1.188 
 
-1.956 * -0.273 
 
0.069 
 
1.472 
 
1.066 
 WOMEN×BUMI 3.293 
 
-4.323 
 
1.196 
   
1.807 * 
 
-0.503 
 
  
0.197 
 BOD_IND -0.532 
 
-0.482 
 
2.323 
 
2.258 
 
-1.434 
 
-1.416 
 
-1.604 
 
-1.450 
 
1.533 
 
1.482 
 
-1.335 
 
-1.312 
 BODLOCK 0.112 
 
0.107 
 
-0.369 
 
-0.363 
 
-0.506 
 
-0.507 
 
0.537 
 
0.515 
 
-0.385 
 
-0.378 
 
-0.741 
 
-0.743 
 NDUALITY 0.383 
 
0.383 
 
0.379 
 
0.379 
 
-0.064 
 
-0.064 
 
4.490 *** 4.500 *** 0.960 
 
0.960 
 
-0.230 
 
-0.230 
 POLCON 0.146 
 
0.145 
 
0.365 
 
0.366 
 
0.405 
 
0.404 
 
1.653 * 1.650 * 0.896 
 
0.897 
 
1.397 
 
1.396 
 INSTOWN 0.005 
 
0.005 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.038 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
1.748 * 1.810 * -2.727 ** -2.743 ** 0.200 
 
0.206 
 FAMILY -0.451 
 
-0.468 
 
-0.100 
 
-0.077 
 
1.137 
 
1.131 
 
-2.257 ** -2.347 ** -0.109 
 
-0.084 
 
1.742 * 1.731 * 
MKTCAP 0.312 
 
0.308 
 
0.846 
 
0.851 
 
0.363 
 
0.362 
 
6.765 *** 6.693 *** 3.974 *** 3.995 *** 2.405 ** 2.394 ** 
DEBT 0.023 
 
0.019 
 
-0.005 
 
0.001 
 
0.117 
 
0.115 
 
0.683 
 
0.558 
 
-0.032 
 
0.005 
 
1.084 
 
1.068 
 BIG4 0.235 
 
0.229 
 
0.563 
 
0.570 
 
0.612 
 
0.610 
 
2.931 *** 2.862 *** 1.541 
 
1.561 
 
2.374 ** 2.365 ** 
ROA(-1) 1.202 
 
1.249 
 
5.288 
 
5.227 
 
-2.227 
 
-2.210 
 
2.159 ** 2.246 ** 2.199 ** 2.171 ** -1.314 
 
-1.302 
 ROR(-1) 0.089 
 
0.076 
 
-0.776 
 
-0.759 
 
0.436 
 
0.432 
 
0.389 
 
0.333 
 
-0.774 
 
-0.757 
 
0.616 
 
0.609 
 STDROA 0.006 
 
0.005 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.020 
 
0.787 
 
0.702 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.840 
 
-0.850 
 MANOWN 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.446 
 
0.533 
 
-0.197 
 
-0.221 
 
0.484 
 
0.493 
 
Industry& 
Period Fixed 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.200 
 
0.203 
 
0.072 
 
0.072 
 
0.032 
 
0.031 
 F-statistic 13.421 *** 13.087 *** 4.857 *** 4.662 *** 2.659 *** 2.544 *** 
VIF(regression) 1.458 
 
2.748 
 
1.444 
 
2.775 
 
1.443 
 
2.760 
 Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions. Significant p-values are bold. *,** and *** represents significant levels of 
10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively. 
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 Table 7: Tokenism to critical mass: Women (2007–2009, n=1094) 
  
DIRREM   
 
DIRREM 
  
 
EXECREM 
  
 
EXECREM 
  
 
NEDREM 
  
 
NEDREM 
Variable 1   2   3   4   5   6 
 C 9.434 
 
9.662 
 
10.651 
 
11.131 
 
5.120 
 
5.460 
 12.549 *** 12.772 *** 5.714 *** 5.911 *** 6.197 *** 6.566 *** 
WOMEN=1 -0.025 
 
-0.587 
 
0.059 
 
-0.294 
 
0.035 
 
-0.385 
 -0.262 
 
-2.065 ** 0.250 
 
-0.415 
 
0.335 
 
-1.212 
WOMEN=2 0.125 
 
-0.166 
 
0.182 
 
-0.896 
 
0.192 
 
0.226 
 1.163 
 
-0.413 
 
0.682 
 
-0.900 
 
1.618 
 
0.526 
WOMEN>=3 0.228 
 
-0.221 
 
0.401 
 
-1.036 
 
0.437 
 
-0.549 
 2.346 ** -0.589 
 
1.668 * -1.108 
 
4.075 *** -1.416 
BUMI -0.540 
 
-1.069 
 
-3.156 
 
-3.970 
 
-0.384 
 
-0.869 
 
 
-1.955
*
 
 
-2.831 *** -4.604 *** -4.227 *** -1.261 
 
-2.090 ** 
(WOMEN=1)×BUMI 1.340 
 
0.856 
 
1.011 
   
2.124 ** 
 
0.544 
 
  
1.427 
 (WOMEN=2)×BUMI 0.694 
 
2.587 
 
-0.072 
   
0.761 
 
  
1.141 
 
  
-0.074 
 (WOMEN=>3)×BUMI 1.090 
 
3.526 
 
2.419 
   
1.226 
 
  
1.590 
 
  
2.653 ** 
BOD_IND -0.102 
 
-0.072 
 
0.268 
 
0.395 
 
-0.303 
 
-0.266 
 
-0.355 
 
-0.248 
 
0.375 
 
0.549 
 
-0.961 
 
-0.842 
 BODLOCK -0.064 
 
-0.069 
 
0.027 
 
0.014 
 
0.077 
 
0.086 
 
-0.351 
 
-0.378 
 
0.059 
 
0.031 
 
0.387 
 
0.430 
 NDUALITY -0.097 
 
-0.097 
 
-0.410 
 
-0.418 
 
0.352 
 
0.356 
 
-1.290 
 
-1.300 
 
-2.210 ** -2.254 ** 4.312 *** 4.375 *** 
POLCON 0.042 
 
0.044 
 
0.035 
 
0.030 
 
0.142 
 
0.143 
 
0.536 
 
0.567 
 
0.181 
 
0.158 
 
1.676 
 
1.703 
INSTOWN 0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.008 
 
0.008 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
2.116 ** 2.301 ** 1.249 
 
1.262 
 
1.181 
 
1.177 
 FAMILY 0.764 
 
0.755 
 
1.393 
 
1.369 
 
-0.464 
 
-0.477 
 
4.383 *** 4.350 *** 3.230 *** 3.175 *** -2.430 ** -2.513 ** 
MKTCAP 0.234 
 
0.234 
 
0.177 
 
0.168 
 
0.356 
 
0.349 
 
5.828 *** 5.827 *** 1.777 * 1.686 * 8.092 *** 7.950 *** 
DEBT 0.078 
 
0.074 
 
0.145 
 
0.135 
 
0.029 
 
0.025 
 
2.708 *** 2.575 ** 2.024 ** 1.876 * 0.923 
 
0.779 
 BIG_4 0.268 
 
0.267 
 
0.190 
 
0.181 
 
0.244 
 
0.240 
 
3.907 *** 3.906 *** 1.105 
 
1.051 
 
3.173 *** 3.129 *** 
ROA(-1) 1.109 
 
1.136 
 
0.411 
 
0.518 
 
1.274 
 
1.326 
 
2.461 ** 2.528 ** 0.361 
 
0.455 
 
2.404 ** 2.514 ** 
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Table 7 continued 
 
            
ROR(-1) 0.243 
 
0.228 
 
0.417 
 
0.390 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.021 
 
1.284 
 
1.209 
 
0.878 
 
0.821 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.100 
 STDROA -0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.019 
 
0.006 
 
0.005 
 
-1.183 
 
-1.359 
 
-1.142 
 
-1.211 
 
0.839 
 
0.715 
 MANOWN -0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
-0.995 
 
-0.953 
 
-0.194 
 
-0.106 
 
0.637 
 
0.594 
 
           
Industry Fixed Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Period Fixed Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R
2
 0.223 
 
0.228 
 
0.094 
 
0.097 
 
0.238 
 
0.244 
 F-statistic 14.079 *** 12.950 *** 5.750 *** 5.327 *** 15.226 *** 14.059 *** 
VIF(regression) 1.455 
 
5.685 
 
1.458 
 
5.659 
 
1.476 
 
5.430 
  
 
 
 
Please refer to Table 1 for operational definitions. Significant p-values are bold. *, ** and *** represents significant levels 
of 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively. 
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 Table 8: Tokenism to critical mass: Bumi (2007–2009, n=1094) 
DIRREM DIRREM EXECREM EXECREM NEDREM NEDREM 
Variable 
            1 2 3 4 5 6 
C 9.384 
 
9.551 
 
9.614 
 
10.177 
 
5.147 
 
5.313 
 12.548 *** 12.831 *** 5.085 *** 5.394 *** 6.309 *** 6.497 *** 
WOMAN 0.231 0.110 0.891 0.466 0.557 0.464 
 
1.043 
 
0.366 
 
1.590 
 
0.611 
 
2.298 ** 1.391 
 BUMI=1 0.083 0.200 0.275 0.390 0.003 0.020 
 
0.631 
 
1.289 
 
0.824 
 
0.995 
 
0.020 
 
0.119 
 BUMI=2 -0.066 
 
-0.060 
 
0.200 
 
0.264 
 
-0.236 
 
-0.200 
 -0.663 -0.491 0.801 0.855 -2.176 ** -1.487 
BUMI=>3 0.249 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.097 
 
-0.837 
 
0.227 
 
0.029 
 2.664 ** -0.024 -0.411 -2.028 ** 2.217 ** 0.161 
WOMAN*(BUMI=1) -1.943 -2.668 -0.520 
   
-1.859 * 
  
-1.011 
   
-0.465 
 WOMAN*(BUMI=2) -0.241 -1.298 -0.548 
   
-0.375 
   
-0.796 
   
-0.777 
 WOMAN*(BUMI>3) 
  
0.784 
   
2.333 
   
0.619 
 1.726 * 2.020 ** 1.237 
BOD_IND -0.070 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.181 
 
-0.078 
 
-0.200 
 
-0.169 
 -0.239 -0.088 -0.245 -0.106 -0.629 -0.531 
BODLOCK -0.067 -0.096 -0.103 -0.170 0.077 0.059 
 
-0.366 
 
-0.531 
 
-0.224 
 
-0.371 
 
0.390 
 
0.297 
 NDUALITY -0.086 -0.091 -0.337 -0.345 0.367 0.366 
 
-1.154 
 
-1.224 
 
-1.790 * -1.843 * 4.542 *** 4.539 *** 
POLCON 0.026 
 
0.038 
 
-0.016 
 
0.004 
 
0.132 
 
0.134 
 0.333 0.490 -0.083 0.022 1.570 1.591 
INSTOWN 0.005 
 
0.005 
 
0.008 
 
0.009 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 1.895 * 2.089 ** 1.201 1.377 0.997 1.094 
FAMILY 0.788 0.772 1.422 1.398 -0.408 -0.412 
 
4.514 *** 4.460 *** 3.226 *** 3.192 *** -2.141 ** -2.169 ** 
MKTCAP 0.225 0.215 0.171 0.142 0.346 0.337 
 
5.569 *** 5.370 *** 1.675 
 
1.397 
 
7.889 *** 7.681 *** 
DEBT 0.080 
 
0.077 
 
0.157 
 
0.153 
 
0.032 
 
0.031 
 2.770 *** 2.670 ** 2.144 ** 2.095 ** 1.014 0.987 
BIG_4 0.252 
 
0.273 
 
0.199 
 
0.257 
 
0.230 
 
0.248 
 3.644 *** 3.966 *** 1.128 1.456 2.964 *** 3.172 *** 
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 Table 8 continued 
                         
ROA(-1) 0.960 1.015 0.392 0.521 1.169 1.204 
 
2.121 ** 2.254 ** 0.336 
 
0.449 
 
2.201 ** 2.267 ** 
ROR(-1) 0.272 0.252 0.411 0.341 0.025 0.001 
1.436 1.341 0.848 0.706 0.119 0.005 
STDROA -0.008 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.021 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
 -1.362 -1.299 -1.388 -1.338 0.754 0.789 
MANOWN -0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.003 
 -0.798 -0.404 0.033 0.327 0.725 0.887 
Industry fixed Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Period fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.225 
 
0.235 
 
0.061 
 
0.070 
 
0.244 
 
0.246 
 F-statistic 14.246 *** 13.444 *** 3.957 *** 4.061 *** 15.711 *** 14.189 *** 
VIF 1.567  5.678  1.453  5.564  1.563  5.238  
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